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Index.php
Note 3 --
The concept of subjective consciousness was developed by Julian
Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the
Bicameral Mind" (1976). Subjective consciousness involves the
ability to recognize yourself as seen by others -- an analog 'I' --
which is internalized and placed into the space of the imagination.
This represented a new mental space based on a metaphorical
displacement of the self, and had not been seen before about 1500
BC. (The 'space' suggested here is a concept predominently defined
in Indo-European languages. People in cultures based on other
languages have formed equivalent solutions.)
You can look through the 'eyes' of this substitute 'I' or even
observe yourself from afar in your mind. Biologically it involves
separation of volition and consciousness in the speech centers of
the brain. 'Memory' and 'self-awareness' are not subjective
consciousness, they are simply aspects of consciousness. All
animals have memories, all animals are aware of themself.
Some people never achieve subjective consciousness, yet they appear
fully functional. Pre-conscious people are almost indistinguishable
from subjectively conscious people. Pre-subjectivly-conscious
people can learn anything, including mathematics, and certainly
they can joke, have emotions, and carry on convoluted dialogues
with each other. However, they rely heavily on the learned
admonitions of parents and authority figures ('oughts' and
'shoulds') and have difficulty with novel situations. Pre-conscious
humans do not have the ability to imagine the reflective thinking
of others, that is, how others might imagine them as thinking.
The concepts are more fully developed on the text pages.
short.php
The fourth source has been Julian Jaynes' book "The Origin of
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" (1976).
Jaynes makes the claim that subjective consciousness did not become
part of human culture (in the Near East) until the first millennium
BC. The overwhelming concerns of our ancestors with the Gods in
earlier antiquity was suddenly explained. Additionally, the book is
a gem of insight into how we think. Jaynes' book is independent of
any of the above. Jaynes' thesis allow understanding ancient texts
as they were meant to be read -- without reference to metaphors,
such as we all too readily attribute to texts we do not understand.
cos.php
-- [http://www.ems.psu.edu/~fraser/BadScience.html]
Those familiar with the work of Julian Jaynes will recognize the
syndrome. Anything learned before the age at which subjective
consciousness is reached, 7 or 8 years, or what Fraser calls
"prepubescence," is held as an absolute by the right brain, for
facts received early in life have never been consciously examined
or explored systematically by the left brain. There are no
conceivable alternatives to these 'facts' and there will be no
reinvestigation. Fraser deals with handed-down 'facts' of natural
science. Some small percentage of students, he admits, can be
convinced of the errors in reasoning. However, for handed-down
'facts' of religion and faith, there is no hope of ever changing a
person's mind for there is no reasoning to correct.
arch.php
Thus I disagree with giving these people credit for "universal
concepts" or for a developed mythological system and an attendent
symbolism. Over the following chapters I will argue, based on the
work of Julian Jaynes, that our ancestors were incapable of
extending their imagination to abstract metaphorical thinking until
perhaps 1500 BC. The Sumerian, Akkadian, and Egyptian languages
were "concrete from first to last," says Jaynes. So was their
thinking. Only after about 1500 BC do we see an extensive use of
similes, and with that the rise of the symbolic use of language
through the use of metaphors. [note 38]
The possibility of a people without the imagination (subjective
consciousness) to conceive of symbolic equivalents or formulate a
mythology to explain their existence -- as Leroi-Gourhan holds --
will be hard for many readers to comprehend, for all of our
reasoning is by metaphors and we simply cannot imagine any other
way of thinking. Symbols for us are the shorthand of abstract
thought. [note 39]
Our modern day 'image' of ourselves is based on a mirror-like
concept of how we think other see us (Jaynes). We conceive of other
humans in a like manner. Surprisingly, this does not seem to apply
to three-dimensional representations, either in the European
Gravettian or much later in Sumer or Egypt. The failure to make
changes in the cave-art depictions -- over a period of 20,000 years
-- is an additional sign of the lack of subjective consciousness.
As Leroi-Gourhan suggested, the cave drawings were never
reinvented.
noah.php
The much later 300 foot-high temple of Marduk at Babylon (built
prior to 1800 BC, expanded in ca 700 BC, rebuilt in 680 BC) was
called "Etemenanki" which transliterates as "The Temple [House] of
the Receiving Platform between Heaven and Earth" (Jaynes). The
living quarters of the God had been replaced with a landing pad.
It is this last, the overwhelming obsession with the multiple Gods,
spells, ceremonies, and religious practices, which remains foreign
to us today. And, as Julian Jaynes notes in his book "The Origin of
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" (1976), it is
completely at odds with the expectation one would have for a people
descended from Paleolithic hunters with their ever-expanding
production of art and tools, or the ingenious farmer and villagers
of the Neolithic who simultaneously developed fishing, herding, and
farming. Yet, the preoccupation with the demands of the Gods
remains the central issue of the later civilizations for over 3000
years.
Is Jaynes on track? Something certainly was missing in Mesopotamia.
"From its beginnings in Sumer before the middle of the 3rd
millennium BC, Mesopotamian science was characterized by endless,
meticulous enumeration and ordering into columns and series, with
the ultimate ideal of including all things in the world but without
the wish or ability to synthesize and reduce the material to a
system. Not a single general scientific law has been found, and
only rarely has the use of analogy been found."
-- Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition
We do have a few examples of analogies. One is the Mesopotamian use
of tokens since 8500 BC to represent products and the use of bottle
seals as signatures. Both of these are metaphorical displacements.
But what is astounding is that it took 5000 years to take the next
step -- that is, to map these three-dimensional objects to a flat
plane and produce a script. The first step was to pictorially
inscribe the content on the outside of sealed jars containing the
tokens. These were used as bills of lading by trade caravans and
ships. The conversion of these pictorial inscriptions to a usable
script took much less time, and its development was predictable as
an extension of the first efforts. The tokens were eventually
discontinued. [note 41]
This failure of a complete overview, the inability to
simultaneously see the details and the complete picture, extends to
art as well. It is apparent in the images of Sumer and also in the
standardized Egyptian depiction of the human body on flat surfaces
showing a frontal trunk but with the head and legs in profile. This
was noted by Jaynes, who adds that this is also especially to be
noted among early Greek two-dimensional figures, which are often
shown as curiously disarticulated groupings of arms, legs, trunks,
and heads. This does not extend to three dimensional art. Even the
earliest Egyptian sculptures in the round were totally realistic,
even if somewhat idealized. [note 42]
Developing Consciousness
The failure in imagination is a lack of subjective consciousness
and this shows also in the languages of Mesopotamia and Egypt.
Julian Jaynes notes that the Sumarian, Akkadian, and Egyptian
languages were "concrete from first to last." The languages had no
room for analogies or metaphors. The speakers could not imagine
alternatives, perhaps could not imagine themselves. To imagine, one
has to take a leap from the concrete. It requires the mental
construction of imagined action beyond the exigency of the moment
and the needs of the everyday. [note 43]
The method of overcoming this failure in imagination, Jaynes
proposes, is through an extended use of metaphors. The primary
trope is analogy, a space in the mind which is equivalent to the
space in the real world. With the addition of an imagined self
inhabiting this imagined space, we are suddenly presented with
ever-expanding possibilities of imagined actions in these places,
interpretations of the effects of the imagined actions, and even
the design of tools imagined as solutions to problems. We, in our
age, do this sort of mapping to a mental space with past, present,
and future experiences, testing the efficacy of possible actions by
stepping through them in our mind. We also lay out time and
mathematical concepts as viewable 'spaces' in our mind. Jaynes'
concept (in brief) of consciousness -- more precisely, subjective
consciousness -- is exactly this placement of an imagined 'I' into
imagined spaces in the mind. It is not actually 'you,' but a
substitute, an analog. You can look through the 'eyes' of this
substitute 'I' or even observe yourself from afar in your mind. If
something in real space and time requires your attention, the 'I'
will shift to be located directly behind your real eyes. Note that,
as so defined, 'memories' (as we imagine recollections) and
'self-awareness' are not part of 'subjective consciousness.' These
are biologically determined and are common to all animals. Jaynes
suggests that historically, subjective consciousness was a late and
learned acquisition for humans. Subjective consciousness is
learned, and is culturally transmitted. Some people never learn it,
yet they appear fully functional.
The stupendous advantage of subjective consciousness is the ability
of the mind (actually the speech areas in the left rear brain) to
be able to analyze the outcomes of multiple alternative actions, to
guess what others might think and do, and to understand how others
see us. Our subjective consciousness is responsible for our
analytical abilities. We use this with such facility that it is
almost impossible to recognize the part of us which does things
without 'thinking' about them, which includes all rote activities.
[note 44]
Just as language is learned by children from their parents, so is
subjective consciousness. You can watch parents proposing 'what if'
situations to small children. Learning subjective consciousness
requires language as a base, the ability to use metaphors as a
means, and the examples of others. Additionally, Jaynes places the
development of subjective consciousness by individuals at about age
7 or 8. Subjective consciousness involves the ability to recognize
yourself as seen by others -- an analog 'I' -- which is
internalized and placed into the space of the imagination, and
which enables you to vault through time. [note 46]
And, if not from parents, how is such subjective consciousness
learned? It is also learned from meeting strangers (not friends and
familiar faces), an experience which forces upon you the idea that
others see you, and thus suggests a narratized space in the mind
where you can see yourself being looked at by others. This analog
'I' becomes the first spark to light up the enormity of possible
analogical mind-spaces which comprise subjective consciousness.
Subjective consciousness can be learned quickly. The same Inca army
which, on November 16, 1532, walked into the trap set by 110
Spanish soldiers and lost 8000 men because there was no Divine
Guidance on how to respond to the novelty of metal-clad men on
horses, became engaged in guerilla warfare and laid ambushes for
the Spanish within months after the death of the Emperor. [note 47]
Jaynes claims that in the Middle East subjective consciousness
didn't develop until after 1500 BC. In the two thousand years after
the "Age of the Gods," which had still looked with certainty
towards the beginnings, subjective consciousness simply was not
needed. As long as nothing changed, life was predictable and safe.
It took a number of world-wide catastrophes, which Jaynes does not
address and is not aware of, to force a change.
According to Jaynes, the Middle East started to wake up to
consciousness with the arrival of 'strangers.' For Mesopotamia the
strangers are the Indo-European invaders from the steppen of Russia
and from India and Persia -- the Hittites (1600 to 1200 BC), who
settled in Anatolia, but especially the later Medes and Persian
invaders of Assyria in 500 BC, followed by Alexander's conquest of
Persia somewhat later. Many of the Greeks, in fact, had already
passed the consciousness horizon with their wide trade contacts
with other peoples, and their near-wholesale rejection of the
authority of kings. In contrast, Sparta, a Greek state which
remained a kingdom through the Classical era, never produced
anything of note except mindless warriers. [note 48]
Their constitution has stood them well for 400 years.
-- concerning Sparta, paraphrased from Herodotus, "The Histories"
(ca 400 BC)
We also have to wonder at the myths and legends which have come
down to us, since the lack of subjective consciousness precludes
detailed memories. We can all verify this for ourselves, for we
remember little or nothing from the first few years of life -- when
we lack language -- and little from before the age of seven or
eight -- when we lack the imagination to embroider remembered
experiences. This suggests that mankind would not be able to recall
its early history, and further suggests that the myths and legends
are fabrications of a later age. But, just as we remember some
events from childhood if they are retold to us (or to ourselves),
so humans would have been able to recall studendous past events if
these were retold or replayed. Retold as myths from generation to
generation and acted out in rituals and ceremonies, these past
events became concrete tribal memories. The accuracy of the
retelling would have been carefully protected. Note how small
children will correct you if you diverge from the telling of a
story that they already know. Ancient festivals reenacted the
events, preserved the memories, and, at the same time, fleshed out
the stories to fill those memories with details. [note 49]
The stories ('myths' to us) and festivals spoke of the deeds of the
Gods, copied their actions, and illustrated their appearance.
Mexicans today still play a football game with a flaming ball
called "Purepucha," recreating the creation events described in
Michoacan myths. Through this dramatization everything displayed in
the heavens becomes part of the earthly domain and localizes Gods
to specific temples and cities. When mythologists today suggest
that the Gods of mythology are only human heroes elevated to godly
status, they have it backwards. We are seeing the celestial Gods
made human. Which is also exactly how most of mythology reads
today. [note 50]
Bicameral Kingdoms
The adoption of subjective consciousness seen in the Middle East
beginning after 1500 BC is also accomplished in India and China at
about the same time, and due to similar causes. Did anything like
it happen in the Americas before AD 1500? The problem with finding
an answer to that question is that we only know the story from the
invaders.
On the one hand, for Mesoamerica, we have a record of the dialog
between Aztec philosophers of the Valley of Mexico and Spanish
theologians, recorded by the 16th century historian Sahagún, which
certainly attests to a well developed subjective consciousness.
These theological discussions are only now being published.
[note 51]
On the other hand, Jaynes noted the striking similarities between
the Middle East of 2000 or 1500 BC and the Incas of South America
of AD 1500. The parallels between the Inca emperors of AD 1500 and
the pharaohs of third millennium BC Egypt are astounding, despite a
separation of 4000 years. For the Inca emperor, as for the pharaoh,
the purpose of life was reunion with the Gods. When the Spanish
threaten one of the Inca cities, the Incas flee, leaving behind
their gold, belongings, and food, taking only the mummies of their
past god-kings to hide them in the mountains. We see the same in
Egypt where the priests frequently remove mummies and hide them
elsewhere when threatened by grave robbers at times of unrest.
Julian Jaynes proposes a generalized model of theocratic city
states and empires, and calls these civilizations 'bicameral
kingdoms.' 'Bicameral' refers to the separation of volition and
consciousness in the speech centers of the brain. The start of
activities is initiated almost exclusively by the right rear brain.
This area of the brain is also responsible for generating speech
which was not consciously thought out beforehand. Because of this,
the right rear brain seems to be the location of the will.
[note 52]
Consciousness, on the other hand, is located almost entirely in the
left rear brain, as are also the ability to understanding the
speech of others and the ability to produce grammatically correct
responses. The left brain is not aware of the right. This is, in
fact, extensible to all right cerebral activities, most notable to
mental failures, that is, dysfunctions. Oliver Sacks details this
in case studies, in "The Man who Mistook his Wife for his Hat"
(1970). We live in our consciousness, unaware of the input from the
right hemisphere.
Bicameral kingdoms have a number of features in common, including
the following.
First, there was either a city God, with the city and surrounding
area operated as a theocracy, or a king, who was held to be the God
or the Son of the God and was revered as such, even after his
death. Theocracies included Sumer and, later, Akkad (in fact, all
Mesopotamia remained as theocracies up to Persian times), India,
China, and all of Mesoamerica. Societies under the direct rule of
God or the Son of God included Egypt, Japan, and the Inca empire.
Second, the dead in these societies were considered alive in some
way, and in need of material goods, especially foods, to accompany
them in their graves. This practice actually extends far back into
more remote antiquity, but becomes obsessive with the bicameral
kingdoms. The new kingdoms initially buried their kings complete
with their retinue. This practice seldom lasted more than a few
generations in Egypt and Sumer, but continued for 700 years under
the Shang dynasty of China (and was only prohibited by the Chou
after ca 1000 BC). The 200 year old Inca kingdom still practiced it
in AD 1532 when the Spanish arrived. In bicameral kingdoms
throughout the world, people (and certainly the elite) were
believed to become Gods on their death. The enormous ceremonial
center of Teotihuacan in Mexico (200 BC -- AD 700), at one time
supporting 200,000 inhabitants, was known as "the Place Where Men
Become Gods." [note 53]
Third, the kingdoms of the 'God on Earth' were jealous of any
competing Gods, including those which had come before, and would
destroy all signs of the preceding Gods, just as the cities of
Sumer and Akkad would readily attack their contemporaries and haul
off the God statues from the temples of nearby cities. The
destruction of all previous records by edict of the Emperor of
China in 213 BC is a late example. The Aztecs destroyed all the
manuscripts of their predecessors in the Valley of Mexico shortly
after AD 1400. And, however subjectively conscious we may proudly
think ourselves to be, it should be noted that the priests who
followed the Spanish invaders into the Yucatan in the following
century burned all the books of the Maya.
Fourth, the citizens were incapable of deceit, or more
fundamentaly, incapable of imagining the deceit of others. Not that
these people could not lie or steal, but they were incapable of
mentally 'narratizing' a complex series of deceptive actions either
by others or by themselves. This is vividly illustrated with the
Inca empire, which had subdued half the South American continent,
only to fall to the deceit of a handful of Spanish soldiers.
As a corollary it should also be noted that these people had no
morals -- there was no such thing as good or bad. Actions were
ordered and the humans responded like robots. The heroes of the
"Iliad" (traditionally placed at 1200 BC) were motivated (if that
is the right word) by glory and shame, without regard for their own
life, as were the Spartans who held off the Persian army at
Thermopylae in 480 BC. In the vacuum left by the departure of the
Gods, religion had substituted prescribed duties for individual
judgement and assumed the absolutist attitudes understood as the
perogative of the earlier Gods. What is absolutely astounding is
that these attitudes lasted over 4500 years -- as in the case of
the Incas, for example.
What we have in these civilizations are people desparately holding
on to the past. They considered themselves "slaves of the Gods,"
only now it was the local God in residence at each temple who
needed to be housed, fed, and adorned. Everyone was employed in the
service of the Gods, and surplus produce and products from the
countryside surrounding a temple were collected (as a tax) for the
upkeep of the temple Gods, for redistribution to temple craftsmen,
and for long distance trade for building materials and more exotic
needs. All humans were as deeply invested in their assigned tasks
as the drones of a bee hive. [note 54]
Population explosions are certainly the mark of each of these
empires, including those which did not appear until long after the
departure of the Gods and Jaynes proposes that the elements of the
bicameral kingdoms arise out of the need to control these large
populations. But I question this. There is ample evidence that
these kingdoms were voluntary societies where massive public works,
whether draining swamps, digging irrigation canals, or monumental
construction, were accomplished without coercion. This last becomes
obvious with a closer look at the histories of Maya ceremonial
centers. These were built with volunteer labor which depended only
on the citizens' confidence in the leader's connection with the
spirit world. [note 55]
Jaynes suggests that these early civilizations were pre-conscious
-- that is, not subjectively conscious. He suggests societies in
which control was effected through auditory commands from the
'Gods' -- actually the remembered admonitions of the governing
class. This kept everyone to their task, and kept all things in
order. Jaynes' use of "hearing the commands of the Gods" is a
shorthand for the admonishing voice (which we still hear today)
generated by the right hemisphere of the brain. In essence, these
people, and perhaps especially the ruling class, were
hallucinating. This description has turned some people away from a
careful consideration of Jaynes' theories even though it is an
accepted fact that the speech center of the right hemisphere acts
as a separate but unconscious entity. [note 56]
But pre-subjective people are entirely functional humans. They can
learn anything, including any skill, reading, and mathematics, they
have the same sense of humor as the rest of us, they experience and
express emotions, and they can converse with others in intricate
details. It is difficult to distinguish bicameral humans from
subjectively conscious humans. You will find yourself persuaded by
each of the long soliloquies of the war chiefs of the "Iliad" when
they meet in council -- yet no one among them takes action without
receiving a command from a God. Bicameral humans seem normal.
However, they rely heavily on the learned admonitions of parents
and authority figures (blurting things out without any forethought,
invariably in the context of 'ought' and 'should') and have
difficulty with novel situations. New situations require the
ability to imagine a number of alternative actions which might be
taken and then to make a selection based on the imagined results. A
pre-conscious human does not have the ability to imagine the
thinking of others, especially reflectively, that is, how other
might imagine them as thinking.
Note 43 --
"Ideas such as objectified conceptions of a mind, or even the
notion of something spiritual being manifested, are of much later
development. It is generally agreed that the ancient Egyptian
language, like the Sumerian, are concrete from first to last. To
maintain that it is expressing abstract thoughts would seem to me
an intrusion of the modern idea that men have always been the
same."
-- Julian Jaynes "The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of
the Bicameral Mind" (1976)
Note 47 --
I would suspect that the delay in subjective consciousness in the
Americas might largely be due to the limited exposure to new
people. The eastern Mediterranean, in contrast, was constantly
overrun by foreign tribes seeking better environments, especially
after both 1500 BC and 800 BC. The same is true of China.
Consciousness also insinuated itself for totally different reasons,
dating from after 2000 BC, as writing came into greater use. Trade
would have been an immense influence (meeting different people), as
would the increased use of scripts for state administration.
Jaynes, in fact, claims that the use of the scripts of the "talking
tablets" displaced the voice of a person to an object, driving
spoken commands into silence, and requiring the reader to listen to
the tablet, rather than imagining a person dictating the text. The
communications of Hammurabi (ca 1700 BC) to his distant government
officials were addressed not to them, but to the tablets he wrote
(in his own hand!). See Appendix A, "Chronology," for more details.
Note 51 --
The note about Sahagún is from Charles Mann, "1491, New Revelations
of the Americas before Columbus" (2006). Mann uses this to
demonstrate that the Aztec were hardly 'savages.' The Aztec
philosophers, by the way, seem to have bested the Spanish in the
discussions. Admittedly, a complex theology is not sufficient to
suggest subjective consciousness, for we see the same in Egypt of
the Old Kingdom and Middle Kingdom before 1500 BC. The status of
consciousness ought to be sought in the accommodation of the Aztec
to the religious environment of the central Mexican region, which
they invaded 200 years before the Spanish arrived, and their
subsequent relationship to the Spanish. This should be considered,
despite the fact that their relationship to the Gods was one of
control (which reflected also in their relationship with other
tribes) rather than the Mediterranean concept of having to placate
God.
Mesoamerica shows all the signs of having developed an intricate
philosophical system which deals in metaphorical constructs after
600 BC. Linda Schele and David Freidel, in "Maya Cosmos" (1993)
attribute the collapse of the Maya in AD 900 to internecine
warfare, not on a religious collapse (which would be an index of
the lack of subjective consciousness), as Jaynes suggested 30 years
ago, based on information available to Jaynes at that time.
Similarly the destruction of ceremonial sites in the Valley of
Mexico were not always accomplished for religious reasons. Many
centers were destroyed by marauding invaders.
However, it is important to emphasise that pre-conscious people are
almost indistinguishable from subjectively conscious people, and
the only real hint pointing to a lack of subjective consciousness
is the inability to deal with new situations. This was not true of
the Maya and the Mexicans at the time of the Spanish invasion, but
I will go with Jaynes' opinion in the case of the Inca empire,
although this is influenced by my lack of knowledge of the
specifics of the change in South America from indigenous religions
to Christianity. The Maya and Mexica, on the other hand seem to
have integrated local traditions (or, more importantly, their
philosophy) and Christianity.
[return to text]
Note 55 --
The Maya never supported standing armies, or a police force.
I disagree with Jaynes' contention that "authority" was needed to
"control" groups of people through leadership, especially large
groups. A look at the Plains Indians shows this is not so. See, for
instance, Robert Utley, "The Lance and the Shield, The life and
Times of Sitting Bull" (1993) or see Linda Schele and David Freidel
"A Forest of Kings" (1990) on the Maya. The need for authority is
necessary to gregarious species, like us humans. But it need not be
a matter of imposed control, and all indications from graves and
houses before 3100 BC in Egypt and the Near East is that there was
no leadership elite.
[return to text]
Note 56 --
Jaynes admits that perhaps people whose role was closest to the
upper levels of leadership would be most under the influence of the
hallucinating voices of the Gods.
It should be remembered that the concept of "free will" does not
develop philosophically until the Classical Age of Greece and the
concept of "chance" remains forbidden well into the Middle Ages of
Europe.
Even today we see, as an example, that 'moral development' -- a
term designating the ability to make independent ethical judgements
-- correlates inversely with religiosity, a belief in the
importance of law, and in general with conservative beliefs. See
Lee Wilkins "The Moral Media: How Journalists Reason About Ethics"
(2005).
moses.php
The Psychosis of Yahweh
De Grazia dismisses the concepts of a developing subjective
consciousness during this period expressed by Julian Jaynes in "The
Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind".
De Grazia writes, "Jaynes was not able to cope with the historical
materials, largely because he relied upon conventional chronology."
De Grazia dismisses the whole concept of the bicameral mind. As he
states.. [note 32]
"In reality it was the catastrophes of the world whose terrible
stresses made hallucinatory leaders out of borderline cases and
staunch believers out of normal people."
-- Alfred de Grazia
This serves to support de Grazia's extensive analysis of the
politics of the Exodus and the psychology of Moses. But as Jaynes
had warned, de Grazia is unable to distinguish a bicameral mind
from a fully functional human and de Grazia's description of Yahweh
reads almost exactly like a bicameral Moses. Yahweh is Moses, but
as the separate right hemisphere of his mind. In effect Moses had a
split personality. This is, in fact, how Jaynes defines the
bicamerality of the mind -- the independence of the right
hemisphere which can guide the verbal left hemisphere and which, in
earlier times, would order the other half around verbally. Even
today the right hemisphere imposes itself completely on
schizophrenic individuals. The rest of us, having learned to
silence the voices, still frequently hear the right hemisphere as
the unvoiced utterings of oughts and shoulds -- "close the door",
"turn off the light", "do you have your keys?" Moses, as a
pre-conscious human, was guided in what he did by the right
hemisphere of his mind and experienced this as a separate 'being'
who spoke to him.
When de Grazia writes, as above, "it was the catastrophes [which]
made hallucinatory leaders out of borderline cases," he is entirely
correct in that the events of the period were certainly stressful,
but those are also the conditions which foster subjective
consciousness. Jaynes has noted (without any reference to
world-wide catastrophes) that this period saw the first light of
subjective consciousness in individuals, first in bemoaning the
failing presence of the Gods and their guidance, and then as a
reaction to the press of strangers. These were only two facets in
the series of unpredictable events and novel conditions which
changed us as humans. The only 'evolutionary' solution was to
engender the ability to imagine what might happen in these new
situations.
Moses certainly had the imagination and ability to organize the
exodus from Egypt of a large group of people and keep it organized
under exceedingly difficult conditions. (Josephus claimed, in the
first century AD, that Moses had previously led a military
expedition to Ethiopia.) The only thing that he failed to imagine,
much later, was the actual entry into Caanan and the whole new set
of problems and conditions to be dealt with in the conquest and
settlement of this new land. Forty years earlier the voice of
Yahweh had driven him; by the time he reached Canaan, Yahweh had
gone silent. Moses dawdled endlessly, and eventually it cost him
his life. [note 33]
Allow me to quote from de Grazia extensively, for his source
document, the second chapter of Exodus, is important. The writing
in Exodus is personal without being self-serving, and is a rare
window on an age which changed humanity. The nexus of catastrophe
and the human mind, desperately seeking to resolve the
unpredictable, is key to understanding how we, within the next
thousand years, became fully human -- that is, how we evolved
subjective consciousness and started teaching this to our children,
silencing the demanding and controlling right hemisphere, and, most
importantly, how we came to rely upon the imagined spaces of
consciousness in the left hemisphere to help us live in the
changing world.
"The abrupt commands of Yahweh, his great noises, curses, and
marvelously clear consultative advice enrich the verses of the
Books of Moses. The lack of explanation is typical of both
hallucinatory voices and of Yahweh's words."
"Yahweh says and Yahweh does. What he says consists of describing
himself, expressing his emotions, relating what he has done,
instructing as to what must be done, and foretelling what he will
do."
"All that Yahweh says is in an absolutely authoritative mode. This
includes those expressions which comment upon behavior that is
against his will or interests."
"What Yahweh does, supplementing what he says, is to cause all
things to happen, even expressions of disobedience coming out of
'free will,' in the sense that if he wished to do so, he could make
people will what he wanted them to will."
"He even asserts a power to be bad, to do evil. He is not bound by
notions of good or evil. 'Who makes peace and creates evil, I
Yahweh do all this.'"
These observations by de Grazia are completely archetypal and
descriptive of the right hemisphere of the brain, and you will
recognize them instantly if you are familiar with Jaynes' research
on schizophrenia, hypnosis, talking in tongues, complex automatic
activities, and the narratives of antiquity.
"Yahweh writes; he organizes lists or rules; he keeps books; and
little else that is technical; he is the product, not the
fountainhead of the science of Moses."
"Write this in your book," Yahweh commands Moses. The organization
of lists and rules is also archetypal of schizophrenia, but the
phrase "little else that is technical" is not quite fair. Typical
of a right hemispherical presence -- the hallucinating voice --
Yahweh is quite accomplished technically. He explains to Moses the
new calendar. Moses has to return to Yahweh with questions, for he
does not understand. It is Yahweh who designs the Ark, and sets all
the safety requirements for the attending priests, their clothes,
the procedures, the curtained tents, and all the altar
appurtenances.
However, it is certainly correct to say that Yahweh was "the
product of the science of Moses." As with us, the right hemisphere
of Moses' brain had access to all that he had learned, and as with
us, the right hemisphere could draw together physical concepts and
synthesize disparate parts into a working whole -- in short, solve
problems -- and then deliver the solutions to the conscious left
hemisphere, as if out of thin air. And Yahweh is quite well aware
of what problems Moses is capable of solving without help. At one
point Yahweh demands an Ark design with red, blue, black, and white
fire. Moses asks how this might be done, and Yahweh, in a fashion
absolutely typical of the annoyance often displayed by the right
hemisphere today, answers, "I fabricate my glory; you make your own
colors."
De Grazia took this anecdote from a secondary source which quoted
some Midrash tradition. The Midrash is the collected Jewish
commentary on the Bible, originally oral, but reduced to writing
after the second century AD. It thus constitutes a comment some
1600 years after the Exodus. In fact, I would think that it
describes the world conditions surrounding the Exodus, but not an
aspect of Moses or Yahweh, despite the fact that it 'fits'
comfortably into the narrative and the characterizations of Exodus.
As Jaynes points out, it is a transitional period. The attendent
visual hallucinations have disappeared -- God no longer strolls
with Adam in the Garden in the cool of the evening. Yahweh has
become an disembodied voice. Only one time does Moses speak face to
face with Yahweh. Fifty years later Joshua is spoken at, rather
than spoken to by Yahweh. "At times Joshua is so uncertain he has
to cast lots." [note 34]
Note 32 --
This quote by de Grazia relates to Jaynes' use of the traditionally
accepted dating of the event of the battle at Troy to ca 1200 BC
(attributable to a hasty comment by Herodotus) and the later
writing of the "Iliad" to ca 700 BC. The Asiatic Greeks have
disagreed with the early date of the war since 400 BC. (See also
the endnotes to Chapter 11, "The Death of Quetzalcoatl," on the
dating question.) However, the late date of authorship of the
"Iliad" is unquestionable. ..........
Note 34 --
I copied these last two lines verbatim from de Grazia who
transcribed them exactly from Jaynes.
[return to text]
Note 39 --
This is also the period of the first appearance of the oracle
inscriptions of the Shang dynasty in China. The "I Ching" is of a
later date. Textual analysis places it after 700 BC, although the
trigrams probably date to before 3100 BC.
people.php
The lack of metaphorical thinking in remote antiquity is critical
to understanding what we are told by our forebears. The languages
in which the first observations of the heavens were rendered was
specific and concrete -- as Jaynes suggests, "end to end." These
people were not creating symbols or dealing in mystical religious
philosophies; what we are told of was exactly what was seen and
experienced.
This is, in fact, what Jaynes proposes, that metaphorical thinking
dates only from about 1500 BC. Jaynes demonstrates this through
examples and details from the earliest historical texts and through
an analysis of cult objects of Mesopotamia and Egypt. Of course,
nothing is proven, for nothing can be proven about the mentality of
an era we did not participate in. But enough striking examples are
brought forward to suggest that his hypothesis is correct. I should
point out that Jaynes was completely unawares of the catastrophism
developed in this text.
What is more significant is that Jaynes' concepts of subjective
consciousness is based on a working model of the mind which has
very large predictive value. This is also why there has been no
follow-up to Jaynes' model. Besides stepping away from mainstream
psychology in writing "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown
of the Bicameral Mind" (1976), Jaynes' model, which locates
consciousness exclusivly in the left hemisphere of the brain and
delegates volition to the right half, in effect closed the door to
further research, despite the fact that vast behavioral areas
remained to be explored, for the basis of the model was largely
philosophical, it was not clinical.
Current stock psychological research, as with neurological
research, is based entirely on stringing together data from endless
clinical studies. It also tends to be reductive, equating
conclusions from clinical data to elements of computer models and
electrical circuitry, despite the fact that the interrupt-based
set-asides of computer processing has no equivalent to the
simultaneous capabilities of the brain -- the only true
multi-processing system.
You will also see a reductiveness to named parts of the brain as if
'firing order' and 'activity' are causally meaningful. They are
not. The dependence of the limits of clinical data is equivalent to
where the study of language arrived at decades ago -- a reduction
of words to sounds and phonemes without a single notion of how to
jump from there to the obvious, grammar.
But despite the turn by profesionals to the academic minutia of
clinical studies, the broad concepts of separate left and right
brain are alive in popular culture. Separate qualities are often
ascribed to the two hemispheres, which are, however, generally
totally wrong. To say that the left hemisphere is capable of
speech, for example, is completely correct, for we are aware of
this faculty. To say that the left hemisphere is logical and the
right hemisphere is intuitive is completely bogus. Nothing which
may be accomplished by the right hemisphere is accessible to
consciousness, so that nothing can be said about the workings of
the right hemisphere except by inference. And the inferences come
from feelings, from words (often inappropriate) which spring to
mind, and from image that impose themselves on consciousness.
[note 3]
Malcolm Gladwell, 2005
A book by Malcolm Gladwell, "Blink" (2005), relates the ephemeral
nature of the communication of the right brain with the conscious
left. The book opens with attempts of the Getty Museum in
California to verify the authenticity of a Greek statue, a kouros,
dating from 500 BC which had been offered for sale to the Getty.
The investigation, which included stylistic considerations, the
provenance of prior ownership, the source of the material, and the
evidence of 2000 years of aging, took 14 months.
In 1986, at the completion of the investgation, the kuoros was
viewed by a number of experts in ancient Greek sculpture. Frederico
Zeri (on the Getty's board), stared at the kouro's fingernails when
unveiled -- they looked wrong. Evelyn Harrison (independent) felt
something was amiss and recommended against purchase. Thomas Hoving
(Metropolitan Museum of Art, NY) recalled that the word that jumped
into his mind at the first sight of the kouros was, "fresh," hardly
appropriate for a statue reputed to be 2500 years old. Hoving also
recommended against purchase.
The Getty shipped the kouros to Greece and called a conference of
experts. Here are additional responses: George Despinis (Acropolis
Museum, Athens), to quote Gladwell, "took one look at the kouros
and blanched." Georgios Dontas (Archaeological Society, Athens),
saw the statue and felt cold, he felt "as though there was glass
between me and the work." Angelos Delivorrias (Benaki Museum,
Athens) felt a wave of "intuitive repulsion" at the first sight of
the sculpture.
The experts were eventually vindicated; the kouros was indeed a
fake. But now look at the broad base of opinions of the experts:
All of them made up their mind within one or two seconds after
first seeing the kouros. Not one of them could articulate the
reasons for their opinion or 'revulsion.' Note that the feeling of
incorrectness seemed to be universal, but also note the words which
entered their minds, and the image of the glass. These were all
articulate people, yet they were stumped to explain their
'feelings.'
What is most amazing is that some inarticulate part of the brains
of these curators managed to come to a conclusion in under two
seconds, when the Getty had managed to get the wrong answer after
14 months of expert investigations. The speed is phenominal, but
the inarticulateness and terseness of communication to the
conscious mind is a definite drawback.
Gladwell, following current theories, writes, "The part of our
brain that leaps to conclusions like this is called the adaptive
unconscious, and the study of this kind of decision making is one
of the most important new fields in psychology."
Daniel Goleman, 2006
As a second example of the reduction of Jaynes's left rear and
right rear hemispheres to smaller constituent parts of the brain,
consider Daniel Goleman's book "Social Intelligence" (2006).
Goleman uses both sociological and neurological clinical sources in
an attempt to define social interactions as dependent on pattern
recognition. Here the high speed recognition, which he calls the
"low road," at least has a clear method of communicating its
findings to the conscious left brain. On recognizing an emotion in
others, the observer will duplicate this in his own body. Goleman
calls it "emotional contagion."
"Emotional contagion exemplifies what can be called the brain's
'low road' at work. The low road is circuitry that operates beneath
our awareness, automatically and effortlessly, with immense speed.
Most of what we do seems to be piloted by massive neural networks
operating via the low road -- particularly in our emotional life."
The "high road," writes Goleman...
".. in contrast runs through neural systems that work more
methodically and step by step, with deliberate effort. We are aware
of the high road, and it gives us at least some control over our
inner life, which the low road denies us."
The "immense speed" of the low road, however, is relative. The
brain can operate at an immense speed with familiar material. All
of us have been looking at faces and associating the expressions
with emotions since we were a month old. The same operation
"beneath our awareness" takes hold in typing or playing a musical
instrument. But ask yourself a difficult question, and it may take
weeks or months before an answer "pops into your mind." It is the
same 'unawares' right brain functions which will have reviewed all
the data that you have consciously accumulated.
Goleman lists (after Matthew Lieberman) some brain areas involved
in processes which escape conscious awareness, as, the amygdala,
basal ganglia, lateral temporal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. It is a long list.
I would be more comfortable with Jaynes' model, which posits a
fully functional second mind, but one which has almost no control
over speech, and whose operation remains completely inaccessible to
consciousness. It is equivalent to being inhabited by another
psyche, and, as has been observed, one who is smart, fast thinking,
correct in most situations, but also willfull, impatient, and
quickly annoyed.
Michael Gazzaniga, 2008
The third example is a book by Michael Gazzaniga, "Human: The
Science behind What Makes Us Unique" (2008), which discusses
split-brain (commissureotomized) patients. 'Being inhabited' is a
concern specifically addressed. Gazzaniga writes..
"Why don't split-brain patients have dual consciousness? Why aren't
the two halves of the brain conflicting over which half is in
charge? ... Are consciousness and the sense of self actually
located in one half of the brain?"
[note 4]
Gazzaniga points out that attention remains fixed on a single
spatial location after the brain has been split, as if the two
halves were still working together.
He also notes Paul Broca's research (of years ago) which located
the center for speech on the left hemisphere, writing, "A
split-brain patient's left hemisphere and language centers have no
access to the information that is being fed to the right brain."
Information can visually be fed separately to each hemisphere by
showing separate images to the left and right eye. (There is some
loss of information, since the optical nerves of the eyes each
split the field of view between the left and right hemispheres.)
Under this condition the left and right hemisphere can be asked to
respond appropriately to the separate images, and this will be
accomplished, for both the left and right brain can understand
speech. Since the hands and fingers are almost totally under
control of either the right or left brain, the response (like
picking an appropriate object) will reflect the decisions of a
single hemisphere. This has led Gazzaniga to some conclusions about
the separate hemispheres (I'll note the right as silent, the left
as verbal), as follows.
"Although the [silent] right hemisphere remains superior to the
isolated [verbal] left hemisphere for some perceptual and
attentional skills, and perhaps also emotions, it is poor at
problem solving and many other mental activities"
This badly short-changes the right brain. Goleman, in the
previously quoted book, in essence suggested that the right brain,
or the parts of the brain unavailable to consciousness or
introspection, is superb at gaging emotions. Gazzaniga call it
"face recognition." The silent right is also capable of completely
logical analysis of data, unlike the left brain which tends to make
up even incorrect theories, as the author points out, seemingly
because it is driven to create order, as, for example, "to find
patterns in sequences of events even when they [the subjects] are
told that the sequences are random."
About the verbal left hemisphere Gazzaniga writes..
"The [verbal] left hemisphere, on the other hand engages in the
human tendency to find order in chaos and persists in forming
hypotheses about the sequence of events [in this example] even in
the face of evidence that no pattern exists: slot machines, for
instance."
The use of the phrase "human tendency" takes us beyond speculation.
Now calling the left brain with its apparent inherent need to come
up with theories, "the interpreter," Gazzaniga finishes his
analysis on a poetic rather than a scientific note..
"How is that two isolated hemispheres give rise to a single
consciousness? The left-hemisphere interpreter may be the answer.
The interpreter is driven to generate explanations and hypotheses
regardless of circumstances. The left hemisphere of split-brain
patients does not hesitate to offer explanations for behaviours
that are generated by the right hemisphere. In neurologically
intact individuals, the interpreter does not hesitate to generate
spurious explanations for sympathetic nervous system arousal. In
these ways, the left-hemisphere interpreter may generate a feeling
in all of us that we are integrated and unified."
The waters have been seriously muddied. Jaynes covered all this 30
years earlier, and without recourse to vapid generalizations about
consciousness. Let me start over at the beginning, and review what
we know.
...........
You have to admit that techniques like making button-hole borers,
detachable harpoons, or pressure-flaked serrated knives are not
biological 'evolutions' -- they are cultural evolutions. The sudden
development and variety of Cromagnon's toolkit is absolutely
astounding compared to the million years that Homo Erectus used a
single general purpose bi-faced hand-ax as their only tool, or the
uniformly sized flint 'side scrapers' fabricated by Neanderthals
for 200,000 years.
There are other parallel developments that are less easy to trace.
Making cords, knotting nets, spinning, and weaving -- all point to
a genesis in remote antiquity of about the same date. Mixing and
compounding colorants were definitely within the scope of
Cromagnon, as witnessed by the decorated caves of France and Spain
and elsewhere. The first pottery dates from about the same time, in
Japan. [note 12]
You would expect that language had something to do with that, but
it is nearly impossible to describe in words how to knap flint or
proceed with pressure flaking. In fact, language is not needed to
pass on the knowledge of flint manufacturing or spinning but rather
language is used to come up with the ideas for the uses of flint or
threads. Language is descriptive, and any one description develops
another, by way of metaphorical extension.
"The grand and vigorous function of metaphor is the generation of
new language as it is needed... "
"[Metaphors] literally create new objects. Indeed, language is an
organ of perception, not simply a means of communication."
-- Julian Jaynes
From language came ideas -- suddenly and in wild profusion. That is
where all the new tools came from. They were "made to order." A
single human with language is capable of generating a range of
ideas far beyond anything the whole rest of the mammal world was
able to think of collectively in a billion years -- or Homo Erectus
was able to generate in over a million years.
...........
I have introduced the concept of subjective consciousness as
culturally acquired in earlier text, and made reference to Julian
Jaynes. Perhaps a very brief review of his work would be helpful here.
I would urge anyone to read Jaynes, at a minimum in order to reach an
understanding of how we think -- through metaphors, narratization, and
spatial fantasizing -- and also how many judgements and solutions to
problems are reasoned out without consciousness -- without conscious
awareness, that is, without what we would otherwise consider as
'thinking.' As noted by Jaynes, actual 'conscious thinking' represents
a thimbleful of the gross volume of all that we would consider as
'thoughts.'
Jaynes spend the first chapter of his book in telling what
consciousness is not. It is not a copy of what we experience; it is
not the source of concepts; it is not needed for learning; and it is
not necessary for thinking or reasoning. It is a difficult chapter,
for much of what we hold dearly as the core of our innermost mentality
is removed as support of consciouness.
... Basis of Consciousness
Language is an absolute prerequisite for subjective consciousness.
Language is a system of naming which begets other names. It is
ever-expansive, especially because the names for anything new are
metaphorically related to things already known (and named).
But language is not enough for consciousness. After all, many animals
use languages but can only conceive of the present tense, "Let's play;
let's eat; let's screw."
"Arf arf, arf arf arf,
the mailman is at the door,
he is going to kill us all."
-- the dog
Here the dog, in her limited consciousness, is imagining the worst for
next few moments, as dogs have done for 100,000 years, be it marauding
bears invading a campsite or evil mailmen tampering with the mailslot.
But the imagined future for a dog does not extend much further ahead.
We, on the other hand, can displace our 'thinking' far beyond the
present or into the past, reconstructing remembered or imagined
spaces. But most importantly, our minds can race through many
alternatives (of "who is at the door?") and make rapid evaluations --
all based on placing a substitute for ourselves into these alternative
spaces.
But what are these mental 'spaces?' The spaces of subjective
consciousness, like language, are also created metaphorically. The
general metaphor is the analog, where every part of the 'real world'
is represented by a corresponding part in the analogical model -- here
the mental space of subjective consciousness. It is like a map: the
map reduces real world geography to marks on a paper, and the map in
turn can be inspected to determine spacial relationships of the real
world.
These spaces are constructed and 'observed' by us, as if we are
situated within them, and are thus inhabited by a copy of ourselves,
an analog 'I'. You can even step back to see the "I" from some
distance as an analog "me". So, to complete the definition of
subjective consciousness, it requires the individual creation of an
analog 'I' in the expanded mind space. It is a facility so familiar to
us that it difficult to think of yourself actually engaging in
'subjective consciousness.' 'Subjective consciousness' is to be
distinguished from 'self-consciousness' or 'self-awareness' which is
observable in many animals.
Now we have subjective consciousness as we understand it: a focus on
the specifics of a space or an action, seemingly located in the mind,
specifically in the left hemisphere, and using an 'I' which is able to
move about through actualities and possibilities and evaluate
alternative courses of action based on probable outcomes. And in these
spaces we can shift time. We can determine future actions (as yet
uncompleted) and also review past actions (making up the elements of
an operating space called 'memory') These evaluations are the level of
'judgement' of which the left brain is capable -- and at which it is
very good.
Subjective consciousness is a focus which completely knits over the
chasms between spatial locations (or times) in your mind -- to make it
seamless to the point of not ever being able to be conscious of not
being conscious. It reorganizes memories to make them seem like
'looked at' spaces, rather than actual sensory impressions. It forces
you to 'remember' anything you have done by taking an exterior spatial
view of the activity. Even mathematical concepts are evaluated as
spatial relationships. Jaynes claims there is no subjective
consciousness except that which is represented by imagined spaces
accompanied by the analogs of normal human actions -- we view, review,
fit, weigh, and manipulate concepts, but all as actions. Time is also
viewed spatially, as a continuous space of differing gradations.
[note 21]
Subjective consciousness is a focus which only occasionally actually
includes awareness of sensory experience. Not that you cannot shift
your consciousness to something that catches your attention or become
acutely aware of some part of your body -- but it is another
(unconscious) part of the brain which tips you off, and then you shift
to inhabit an analog 'real' space, moving your analog 'I' to just
behind the eyes. [note 22]
More importantly, and despite what you think occurs in your mind,
subjective consciousness excludes the formation of concepts, so-called
reasoning, and most judgements about physical objects and other
people. There is no recollection, for example, of how you managed to
drive your car home, and there is awareness, but no 'thinking'
involved in panic reactions. A later review of a newly constructed
memory will add all the 'reasoning' that determined your actions. All
immediate 'thinking' is done in the background, unconsciously, and by
the right brain. You don't have any awareness of this until the
conclusion are transmitted to the subjective consciousness of the left
side. [note 23]
We only apply logic (as 'reasoning') after the fact. Similarly, ask
any artist where ideas come from -- they appear out of thin air. Ask
Einstein where his concepts came from -- they came from no-where,
usually while shaving. Einstein remarked that he shaved very
carefully, for new ideas would pop into his mind and often startle
him. This happened during other mundane activities also.
"I thought of that while riding my bike."
-- AE
None of consciousness is anything like what a wolf does to chase down
an elk, which is totally automatic, involves quick judgements and
pre-guessing the moves of his prey, and who knows what else. If you or
I did something as automatic we would make all the right moves and
never be 'conscious' of them. What we would be conscious of is the
overview of the real space we are operating in (chasing an elk), but
seen as if we were watching a movie, with ourselves simultaneously as
actor and viewer.
Our 'consciousness' could be elsewhere while we were chasing the elk.
This condition is easily recognized in driving a car, where we make
all the right adjustments to traffic, yet are "lost in thought" most
of the time, lost that is, in our left-brain consciousness. We could
be considering the opening notes of some piece of music. The car trip
(or elk chase) would still be completed with the same efficiency --
our body would still make the correct decisions on how to move, where
to turn, when to stop. And none of it would involve "thinking" as we
commonly understand it.
The right brain can perform any 'learned' activity blindly, like
playing a piano, or driving a car. But it has trouble with new
situations. Evaluating anything new is the task of subjective
consciousness. In fact, subjective consciousness will hinder automatic
activity. Try becoming aware of your fingers while typing. You will
start making mistakes or even come to a halt. Become aware of someone
looking at you while you are walking and your step will falter and
your shoes will scuff the floor.
Development of Subjective Consciousness
What Jaynes next suggests is that subjective consciousness is learned
by children at about age 7 or 8. It involves recognizing themselves as
seen by others -- an analog 'I' which is then internalized and placed
into the spaces of the imagination. This analog can move around,
perform actions, evaluate results, and can even vault through time.
Parents constantly guide small children through numerous 'what if'
situations and badger them with metaphorical constructions and
reminders of remembered events, in effect teaching them subjective
consciousness. It also teaches the child what others might be
thinking. Since it is learned, it is cultural, not biological. And,
Jaynes claims, because subjective consciousness is language-based, it
is easily learned by children as soon as they gain some facility with
the expansion of language into metaphors. [note 24]
Subjective consciousness is deeply imbedded in the teaching of
subjective consciousness. It is as if we could say that the
'expression of subjective consciousness' is the 'teaching of
subjective consciousness.' In this respect it is no different from our
teaching use of language skills.
Historically, Jaynes places the creation of the internal "I" after the
development of written texts. It was also in response to a population
expansion of the Middle East because the other source of subjective
consciousness is meeting new people -- not those familiar to us. For
the most part we don't look at those familiar to us, nor do we
question how they see us. Having to meet strangers causes you to
wonder how they are seeing you and this results in the creation of an
analog 'I' as the way you imagine others see you. By reflection this
then becomes the way you imagine yourself. [note 25]
The quality of subjective consciousness changes over time. Since it is
cultural, there is no biological evolution involved, but subjective
consciousness does evolve. Jaynes has documented the radical changes
over the span of a few hundred years during the first millennium BC in
Greece and the Levant, and noted the changes in South America over the
span of a few months. The quality of subjective consciousness will be
different from one person to another, although any social group with
the same language and a common culture will for the most part share a
common subjective consciousness.
Both the left and right hemisphere of the brain can understand speech.
However, only the left brain can speak. The right brain specializes in
seeing objects in context and has a sense of spatial relationships.
The left brain concentrates on specific objects but is able to
apprehend and order linear patterns, including, of course, speech and
stories. [note 26]
That is a sort of shorthand, for the right hemisphere is also involved
in speech -- operating the mouth and vocal cords. And the right brain
can talk to the left brain in 'voices' which are either heard silently
in consciousness of the left hemisphere, or pass right through and are
spoken. You will see yourself doing this, for example, in greeting
familiar people, but you will also find yourself mouthing off at the
most inopportune moments.
The 'voices' from the right brain are the remembered admonitions of
your parents, and later, your superiors. It is your right brain that
brings to mind such things as "it is time to go," or "close the door."
It is the right brain that always has the seamingly appropriate
solutions, for it 'sees' things in the overall 'familiar' context and
knows what to do in any situation which is not novel. It is also the
more creative -- solutions to many 'computable' problems come from the
right.
The left brain concentrates on individual objects often to the total
exclusion of context, but works easily in linear format -- like
remembering phone numbers as one unit (which is but a larger
decontextualized object), remembering songs and stories, and putting
all the words into the right order when you speak. The left is verbal,
linear, and, because of the imagined spaces that can be examined,
analytical. But in actuality it probably spends most of the time just
meandering. The only conscious 'thinking' we do is musing and
reflecting -- always by means of imagined actions in imagined spaces.
The right brain often gets annoyed with the left, and you will hear
yourself muttering comments on your lack of directed thinking or your
behaviour.
Jaynes points to the left brain as the center of our consciousness: we
are 'aware' of left brain activities, but never of the right-brain.
When the left brain gets into a bind on a problem, it is the right
brain which often spits out an answer to the left-brain's
consciousness. "It popped into my mind."
In an age before written texts, or before reflection on the self as
seen by others, the right brain 'spoke' -- actual words were heard by
the left side. We still hear these admonitions today, but mostly
silently, "close the door." The wonderfully common-sense right
hemisphere at times has to warn the left half of something, or get its
attention. Jaynes suggests that using heard speech might have been a
shorthand used by the right brain because the rear commissure
connecting the two halves is only a few millimeters in diameter. By
comparison, the olfactory commissure (which we do not have at all) in
dogs and rodents is, as I mentioned, 10 times that diameter, thus 100
times the area. These animals integrate left and right brain functions
surrounding smell much better than we integrate our verbal functions.
Our right to left communication today is often in visual concepts, I
suspect, rather than words, although we still hear our mind 'say'
things -- silently. It can be guaranteed that almost all statements of
'correct behavior' which jump out of our mouth are initiated in the
right brain. However, frequently they are inappropriate. The right
brain does not deal with anything novel and cannot analyze the nuances
of a new situation and peruse the alternate possibilities which the
left brain can imagine. Often you will find yourself saying, "My first
thought was... but upon further consideration..."
... Instructions from God
Throughout the "Age of the Gods" and for 2000 years after, these
instructions from the right brain were 'heard' as the voices of the
Gods: instructions on crop management, irrigation, and whatever else
was appropriate for daily life of a community. There were many
thousands of people in Mesopotamia and Egypt involved in agriculture,
distribution, and trade. These were the first large populations to do
repetitive backbreaking communal tasks. Grain production requires that
type of work, but it was done without reluctance because the Gods were
held as real, superior, and absolute in power, and a caretaker and
slave mentality had developed. Society was to continue as it was: with
people sowing and reaping the fields of the Gods. Early inscriptions
insist on this.
Jaynes points out the 'authority' of spoken words, and he supplies
extensive data from schizophrenics and commissureotomized patients.
The right brain under these conditions issues commands, not solutions
or suggestions. This is not different, he claims, from what was
experienced by the people of Mesopotamia and Egypt during the period
up to about 1500 BC.
It is the development of written texts (claims Jaynes) which opened up
a new vista: the possibility that words could be independent of a
person and thus 'voice' could be abstracted into silence. This is an
amazing concept which filtered down into society over the next few
hundred years as parents modeled such silent consciousness to
children. And with that the voices disappeared. [note 27]
... Differences
As examples of the differences in consciousness of vastly different
people, compare the war edicts and bragging of the Assyrians with the
contemporaneous 'Spring and Autumn' Wars being waged in China. The
wars were no different -- and the same example of the warring Gods
stood before both groups in the skies overhead. But the attitudes were
completely different. The Assyrians were bellicose and cruel and
insisted on devasting the peoples they had conquered -- always over
matters of tribute. [note 28]
"Throughout the Assyrian war records runs the monotonous mantra. "I
destroyed, I devastated. I burned with fire". No hint of mercy or
pity here; but ... repetitive and total conquest. Assyria, often
likened to the Nazis, was a thoroughgoing military nation, highly
disciplined. Her characteristics were destructive invasion,
deportation and taxation."
-- CIAS, [http://www.specialtyinterests.net/]
The Chinese states went to war over the same sort of resources, but
the tactics of war and settlements took a different course. By 400 BC
there was already a conscious efforts to view tactics philosophically
and write about them, as follows. The Chinese in fact have never
favored warfare.
"In general, the method of employing the military is this:
Preserving the [enemy's] state capital is best, destroying their
state capital is second best. Preserving their army is best,
destroying their army is second best. [...] ... attaining one
hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of
excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the
true pinnacle of excellence."
-- Sun-tzu, opening lines "The Art of War" (ca 400 BC).
[note 29]
... Points of Disagreement
For many people language is so obviously and unquestionably innate
that Jaynes will make absolutely no sense at all. And without the idea
that language could have evolved culturally, you cannot understand the
idea of a cultural evolution of subjective consciousness. Growing up
bilingual helps, for it provides some perspective. But most of us fail
to examine even our own 'word-thinking' and the language of others.
Another contributing factor is the incredible chauvinism we have
adopted to separate ourselves from animals.
Other people will dismiss Jaynes over the details of the "Iliad,"
which he used as his start-up example of a change in consciousness.
The objections involve arguments about when the "Iliad" was written,
whether Troy existed at all, and how a group of Greek pirates could
possibly wage a ten-year war. Also, since Jaynes is using 1100 BC for
the Trojan war (a date first suggested by Herodotus), he is forced to
assume that the transmission of details of the epic was via some sort
of semi-conscious bards. This follows a theory of 'bardic
transmission' dating from studies of Balkan epic poetry earlier in the
20th century, but the exact transmission from bard to bard has since
been disproven. [note 30]
I have other differences with Jaynes myself. I object to Jaynes'
insistence on the need for kings and leaders. It seems to be a
peculiarly Western outlook that you cannot have a village of 200
people without some sort of control, much less a city of 10,000. Often
he slips into generalization like "the mechanism of social control."
Archaeologically, it appears that there were no leaders, kings, or
pharaohs in control before 3100 BC. However, we do not need to look
among antique or primitive societies alone for egalitarian societies.
The precursor of the Dutch Republic, a collection of city states,
managed adequately without promoting anyone to absolute power for
several hundred years. Humans will cooperate -- it is natural for us
as a gregarious species, although it is also natural to demand
leadership in times of social stress, as happened after 3100 BC. The
idea of 'individuality,' which today makes us almost perversely
independent and uncooperative, is a very late concept in Europe,
probably dating to well after the 16th or 17th century AD. [note 31]
Jaynes uses the idea of 'social control' to suggest how the voices of
the Gods -- which most definitely occurred -- might have started and
been located in the right hemisphere of the brain. He resorts to the
suggestion of an "evolution by natural selection as a method of social
control." But this is an unclear concept. I would suggest that
"natural selection" is not an issue, primarily because the need for
"social control" is not a fact.
I would suggest, instead, that the structure of the mammalian brain is
already lateralized for spatial and linear functionality, respectively
in the right and left hemisphere. This is in itself enough to
naturally place speech functions -- which require linear order -- on
the left. In addition, the speech functions are fluidly relocatable,
which I think would argue against an evolutionary mandate. Some people
have speech functions located on the right, as with those who suffered
left hemisphere damage at an early age, and with some left-handed
people.
What Jaynes, publishing in 1979, was not aware of was the research by
Talbott in 1980, and the subsequent expansion on this over the next
twenty years, showing the enormous cultural influence of the planets
standing in the sky close to Earth, which were universally understood
as the Gods who directed all human activities -- the very Gods whose
voices Jaynes places in the right hemisphere.
Jaynes instead uses marked graves in the early Neolithic (from 7000
BC), the rather occasional extravagant graves of 'kings,' and the
display of the skulls of the dead in homes (and later temple
structures) in various locations in the Middle East, to suggest that
the hallucinating voices of the dead continued to be heard. In Egypt
during historic times it was certainly held true that the voice of the
dead pharaoh remained to be heard to advise and direct. But this
period follows directly on the prehistoric era when, for a thousand
years or more, mankind was confronted by the image of a large head
looming constantly above the north horizon.
We have no idea of the function of all the variously displayed and
decorated skulls. In the era before 3100 BC, the skulls might have
been honored dead relatives, parents, or leaders, or they might have
been sacrificial victims. The images in the sky after 4200 BC must
have had a enormous influence on humans, and humans as ever imitated
what they saw. The exact measure of this is not revealed until after
the head in the sky had disappeared. If anything induced 'voices of
the gods' to be heard via the rear commissure between the right
hemisphere and the left, it would have been this constant
thousand-year image of a face in the sky.
... advantages
We could ask, What is the advantage of subjective consciousness?
Obviously, in the remote past, it was used to get through change,
whether cataclysmic change or the need to live through social change.
But, we could ask, what is the utility in today's milieu?
From my perspective, subjective consciousness is an absolute delight.
It allows traveling through time, visiting distant places, and
imagining cosmic relationships. It also allows navigating the
complexities of relationships, imagining technology not yet in
existence, and selling products to those who do not need them.
We should also not neglect the possibility that the subjective
consciousness of the left brain aids the normal background processes
engaged in by the right brain. Certainly we know that the right brain
knows whatever the left brain knows, and is able to work out solutions
to questions that the left brain just cannot handle. Einstein's care
in shaving is an example of the startling revelations which can come
to consciousness as if out of nowhere. Einstein's revelations
certainly were not limited to parental admonitions.
I suspect that a salesman who has gone through attempts to enter the
mind of his customers will have offered his right brain all of these
scenarios. They will be stored somewhere and can be accessed as
needed. The best approach for a particular customer will be selected
and presented to subjective consciousness as if out of nowhere --
based on an almost instantaneous analysis of the customer's
psychological state. Considering the speed with which the right brain
can operate, this certainly is a more likely process than having to
wait for subjective consciousness to trip through a number of imagined
scenarios. Everyday speech and the creations of poets and artists must
be generated like this. I also suspect that the right brain today,
rather than using speech to alert the subjective consciousness, as was
traditionally done, uses images to a greater degree. But of course how
subjective consciousness operates, and what its particular qualities
are, depends completely on how a person is brought up in a particular
social context, including the qualities of a particular language. We
don't all think alike.
Children
Lastly, let me add some notes on children and subjective
consciousness. Children learn language from adults who, on meeting a
child, always test the level of the child's language abilities and
then switch to a 'caretaker language' to continue conversing. A
'caretaker language' is grammatically slightly advanced beyond the
level of the child. We have all learned this teaching technique, and
we use it automatically with children. People who 'baby-talk' to
children are those who have made no effort to gage the child's current
abilities. [note 32]
What Jaynes suggests is that subjective consciousness is learned
similarly to the way in which language is learned -- parents teach
children subjective consciousness, and have done so actively since
about 1500 BC. In the interaction with parents (subjectively conscious
parents) children are constantly confronted with snippets of real and
imaginary situations which, over the course of years of exposure, and
graded to their abilities, suggest the possibilities of imagining what
they might do under the proposed situations. What is always suggested
to the child is what actions they might take -- because all 'thinking'
in the mind involves an analog of actions in the real world. Thus both
the analogical 'spaces' and the actions to be performed in them are
constantly put forth to children, and this is done with the same lack
of awareness that we use with a graded caretaker language. This
process also forces upon a child the recognition that others (mainly
their parents) see them in their mind. We often identify the age of
seven or eight as the first glimmer of 'self-consciousness' in
children. It is, in actuality, the glimmer of their awareness of our
consciousness. [note 33]
It is instructive to observe children 4 to 7 year old, although the
state of subjective consciousness depends very much on their verbal
abilities and the interaction they have with their parents and other
adults. There seems to be a difference also between girls and boys,
perhaps because girls (in our society) are more engaged in
relationships by their mothers. Pre-conscious children have
recognizable behaviour patterns which might be reflected in the
following to various degrees. The following notes are my observations.
(They are not from Jaynes.)
* They lack any clear memory of the past except for events they have
been told about and some critical events which may have been
reenacted mentally. Pre-language "memories" of events are almost
entirely absent in everyone, for most memories are 'constructed'
by a subjective consciousness. (As I have pointed out, this is not
true of spatial memories.)
* They show little of the self-consciousness which would result in
being able to see yourself from an exterior perspective -- in
effect as being seen by others. Children are self-aware, as all
mammals are, but are unable to displace this to an exterior
perspective. Their behavior is simply regulated by parental
admonitions and the parental controls of shame, guilt, or
embarrassment.
* The imagination of a child, as exercised in play, is often
unbounded by reality and often lacks a measure of time.
Importantly, the play space often lacks themself as an involved
actor. Older children will often 'correct' the play fantasies of
younger children, in effect mimicking parental teaching of
subjective consciousness.
* They are often very opinionated, blurting out the opinions of
their parents in lieu of any original 'thinking' on a subject, a
trait which often carries far into adulthood. Original thoughts on
a particular subject would involve being able to create imagined
spaces for action in the mind and walking an analog 'I' through
these spaces to evaluate alternative outcomes.
* They will interrupt adult conversations with non-sequitors, for
there is no ability to narratize the present as a mental space in
which they can fit themselves and observe the (real) space as if
from afar (that is, in the mind), and to narratize into that
mental space what others might hear or might be thinking at the
moment.
* They often have hopelessly inadequate concepts of space and travel
time ("Are we there yet?"). Children experience a dilation of real
time which adults do not notice. Children (young children,
especially) do not have access to the musings of subjective
consciousness, with which adults fill real time, to replace the
second by second experience of actual time.
Yet children are fully functional. They learn to read and do math.
They learn skills. They learn how things work, and how to interact
with others. They can create and appreciate jokes. They know who they
are. But the guide to their actions is the voices of parental
admonitions and attitudes which were heard, remembered, and recalled.
It is, in fact, the right hemisphere which does this for any
predictable situation.
Note 6 --
Steven Mithen, in "The Singing Neanderthals" (2006), attempts to make
a case for the evolution of language based in part on music and dance.
The book involves a lot of guesswork and unfounded suppositions about
prior hominids in an attemp to build the case for a slow evolution
from natural selection. There was no "slow evolution."
Jaynes also attempted to make a case for how language might have
developed, but it is too specific to Cromagnon and guesses about the
effect of the European climate, and "selective pressures" to make much
sense.
Alfred de Grazia is, I feel, closer in observing..
"Here is an area where evolutionary thought is especially
self-contradictory and, consequently, slippery and evasive. It can
only get from one small change to the next but cannot get from the
beginning to the end; it can explain some intra-species changes,
like horse-breeding and the Beltsville turkey, but it cannot
explain a major development. No known mechanism directs a long
string of slight modifications in the germ plasm. Even if we were
to concede that the jump from hominid to human were only apparently
large but was biologically small, human genesis would admittedly be
a hologenetic occurrence; when it occurred, hominid life changed
drastically; it speciated."
-- "Homo Schizo, Human and Cultural Hologenesis" (1983?)
Note 22 --
The shift of attention is managed by the "reticular formation"
(Jaynes) or the "amygdala" (Goleman) or some other primitive element
located at the base of the brain, with connections to sensory and
motor areas of the brain and the spinal cord, which has the purpose of
awakening certain parts of the nervous system while suppressing others
on sensing external stimulations which require attention.
Note 30 --
I am more inclined to view the "Iliad" as fiction purposely crafted
'in the style of' an earlier period or a lost earlier literature, or
possibly carried forward from a remote time, not as history, which is
a substrate added over time, but as a tragedy. The "Iliad" spans only
some two months, and is not about a war, but about the effects of the
anger of Achilles.
There is no archaeological evidence for an extended war at Troy and
the city has not been located or identified. The hill at Hisarlik is
too small to serve as the citadel of Troy, it is not in sight of the
sea, and was repeatedly destroyed by natural disasters, and at the
wrong times. But by the sixth century BC, as the Asiatic Greeks faced
their defeat by the Persians, the "Iliad" became the favored epic of
the heroic forebears of the conquered Greeks. Everyone believed that
the war had happened. Greeks on both sides of the Aegean traced their
linage to the heroes of the "Iliad."
There is not a single mention of texts in the "Iliad," even though
these were already in wide use in Mycenaean Greece (supposedly by 1200
BC, and certainly by 900 BC). The tradition in antiquity, that Homer
was blind and therefore could not write, points to a purposeful
falsification also, and lent an aura of authenticity to the epic.
But the final composition of the "Iliad" has to be placed in the 8th
or 7th century BC when the Greeks possess an alphabet. The poem
selectively picks details from an imagined past. The battle tactics
are wrong, as is the armor, and the funeral customs are foreign. There
are anachronistic references to the Olympic Games, and the Gods are
mocked -- all suggesting a composition well after 700 BC.
If the "Iliad" had achieved status as a classic at an earlier time,
the vocabulary should have been recognized as archaic by the Greeks of
the third century BC, since language conforms to classics. Alfred de
Grazia suggests that the 'heroic diction' was a purposeful amalgam of
dialects of a late date.
Jaynes also forgets (perhaps) that events which are discussed and
recounted will be remembered. This is true for early childhood
experiences, and ought to be true of pre-subjectivly consciousness
people also. Thus it is quite possible that the whole of the "Iliad"
(as Talbott has claimed) is but a retelling of the "War of the Gods"
of 3147 BC. It strikes me, still, as a purposeful creation -- in a
purposeful 'antique' style. If so, it is all the more marvelous that
the "Iliad" passed through Jaynes' analysis transparently.
What we are seeing perhaps is the embellishment of memory on a grand
scale, although the rigidity of the underlying structure of the
"Iliad" argues for a conscious composition. But the "Iliad" was also
extensively edited and codefied after about 600 BC by others.
The "Iliad" is written with clear intent, as was certainly understood
since the 18th century AD by literary critics -- Guy Davenport in 1954
wrote, "Not a line .. can be put out of its place" -- and with a clear
political balance. But the facts of a detailed fiction along with an
adopted diction has little to do with Jaynes' analysis, which deals
with the use of body-part nouns for feelings and emotions and the
actions initiated by the Gods. There is no need to consider the
historical dimensions of the "Iliad." Jaynes makes this clear in the
closing paragraphs of his investigations of the "Iliad," and I
certainly agree with his conclusions.
Note 21 --
Most of our memories are constructed, or rather reconstructed, by us
if they involve action, for we fill them out with the appropriate
details, to the point of making up dialogues. Which is why memories
reported as evidence in courts are suspect. Of course we do have other
memories too. You will probably remember the layout of your house at
age three, even though you do not remember a single event or action
from that age. All animals are capable of memories involving the
geography of their environment, and often with astounding accuracy.
[return to text]
Note 24 --
There is obviously more to learning "what others might be thinking"
than what is suggested here. Sara Blaffer Hrdy writes..
"The reason our species has managed to survive and proliferate to
the extent that 6 billion people currently occupy the planet has to
do with how readily we can learn to cooperate when we want to. And
our capacity for empathy is one of the things that made us good at
doing that."
"Predators from gopher snakes to lions have to be able to
anticipate where their quarry will dart. Chimps and gorillas can
figure out what another individual is likely to know or not know.
But compared with that of humans, this capacity to entertain the
psychological perspective of other individuals is crude."
-- "Mothers and Others," Natural History (2001).
Note 25 --
The reflections occur in everyday conversations. It is not unusual to
hear someone say, "I did not want you to think that I thought you
would think that I thought.. so and so." Convoluted on close analysis,
but perfectly understandable to the parties concerned.
Note 26 --
In referring to the 'left' and 'right' brain we are talking primarily
about the speech centers -- Broca's area and Wernicke's area. The
abilities of the right and left hemisphere listed in the text are
abbreviated for the sake of discussion. To gain an appreciation for
the incomprehensible complexity of mental functions, see the classic
book by Oliver Sacks "The Man who Mistook his Wife for his Hat" (1970)
which deals with dysfunctions of the right hemisphere. These right
hemisphere abnormalities are not noticed by the subjects, whereas left
hemisphere dysfunction are experienced and can be described by
patients.
Note 27 --
At the close of the age of the prophets, the time from Elijah to
Zachariah, Bible texts start including admonitions against hearing
voices and talking in tongues.
[return to text]
Note 28 --
See also the writings of Edward T. Hall and any number of academics
(and non-academics) who have taken up these topics. The principles
first expounded by Hall are today used in international marketing.
[return to text]
Note 31 --
In "Collapse" (2005), Jared Diamond writes about communal decision
making in the highland communities of New Guinea, still in practice
after the arrival of Dutch and Australian colonial government in the
1930s...
"Decisions were (and often still are today) reached by means of
everyone in the village sitting down together and talking, and
talking, and talking."
And, he notes, this happens today to the extreme frustration of New
Guinea goverment officials. As I note elsewhere, the same process of
reaching complete consensus through endless talk was used by the much
larger groups of Plains Indians, in the 19th century AD, to the
frustration of US treaty negotiators.
(end)