http://SaturnianCosmology.Org/ mirrored file
For complete access to all the files of this collection
	see http://SaturnianCosmology.org/search.php 
==========================================================
Previous D.B.Larson's book <../cana/cana02.htm>Index of D.B.Larson's
books <../cana/index.htm>Next D.B.Larson's book <../cana/cana04.htm>
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chapter III

The Electrons

*I*

It is quite unlikely that the acceptance of Rutherford's nuclear
hypothesis would have been so immediate and so uncritical had it not
been for the fact that the ground was already prepared for such a
hypothesis by the discovery of the electron and of radioactivity, which
indicated (1) that particles smaller than atoms exist, and (2) that such
particles are ejected by atoms in the radioactive disintegration
process. The inference that the atom is a composite structure built up
of these sub-atomic entities follows naturally and logically; hence the
question which Rutherford and his contemporaries were trying to answer
was not the general question of atomic composition, the answer to which
they considered self-evident, but the question as to /how/ the electrons
and other sub-atomic particles are arranged in the atom.

However, the natural and logical inference on first consideration does
not always stand up under more deliberate and thorough analysis, and so
it has been in this case. The original argument based on the known
characteristics of radioactivity may be summarized as follows:

(a) Under certain conditions atoms disintegrate.
(b) Electrons are found among the disintegration products.
(c) Therefore, electrons are constituents of atoms. 

At first glance this argument may seem sound, and in the formative years
of the nuclear hypothesis it was accepted without question. Even today
it is still orthodox doctrine. But the true status of the argument can
be brought out clearly by stating the analogous argument concerning the
photon.

(a) Under certain conditions atoms disintegrate.
(b) Photons are found among the disintegration products.
(c) Nevertheless, photons are not constituents of atoms. 

Here we find that on the basis of exactly the same evidence, the
physicist arrives at diametrically opposite conclusions. Because
preconceived ideas concerning the electron suggest that it /could/ be an
atomic constituent, the evidence from the disintegrations is accepted as
proof that it is, whereas similar preconceived ideas concerning the
photon suggest that it could not be an atomic constituent, and exactly
the same evidence is therefore taken to mean that the photon was created
in the process. Actually, of course, the physical evidence does not
distinguish between these alternatives, nor does it preclude the
possibility that some other explanation may be correct. What the
evidence shows is that the electron either

(a) was a constituent of the atom, or
(b) was preexisting within, but not a part of, the atom, or
(c) was derived from the surrounding space, or
(d) was created in the disintegration process, or
(e) originated from some combination of the foregoing, or
(f) had some other origin consistent with the evidence. 

At the time the nuclear atom was originally conceived, the existing
physical knowledge was not extensive enough to permit visualizing these
alternatives that have been listed. The idea that electrons might be
created in some physical process, for instance, was probably altogether
inconceivable to Thomson or to Rutherford. But today this is
commonplace. Such creation is currently being observed in a great
variety of processes, ranging all the way from the production of a
single electron-positron pair by an energetic photon to the production
of a shower of millions of particles by a cosmic ray primary. This new
information has made it apparent that the emission of electrons from
radioactive material does not necessarily have the significance which
was originally attached to it. Current thinking favors the creation
hypothesis as the best explanation of this phenomenon, and the textbooks
are slowly and reluctantly trying to incorporate this new viewpoint.
Kaplan tells us, for example, ?... it must be concluded that in beta
radioactivity, the electron is created in the act of emission.?^26
<../cana/references.html#ref26>

But the same textbook which gives us, on page 154, this conclusion based
on up-to-date evidence, still repeats on page 39 the completely
contradictory nineteenth-century judgment that the emission of electrons
by matter is ?convincing evidence that electrons exist as such inside
atoms,? and it goes on to present the atomic theory based largely on
that outmoded idea as if it were fully in accord with present-day
factual knowledge. This is not a peculiarity of this particular text.
Any other modern text which we might select gives us essentially the
same contradictory picture. For instance, another text book tells us,
?The disintegration experiments (which indicated emission of protons by
atoms) provided definite proof that protons are components of nuclei of
all elements.?^27 <../cana/references.html#ref27> Then on the very next
page the text goes on to say, ?It might be argued that if an electron
can be emitted from a nucleus, it must have been there before,? but in
spite of the fact that this is exactly the same argument which is
characterized as ?definite proof? on the preceding page, it is here
dismissed with the statement, ?This solution... could not, however, be
upheld.? Here is a graphic example of what was meant in the introductory
chapter when the present-day atomic theory was described as a curious
and contradictory mixture of half-century old ideas with up-to-date
conclusions. Any theory which is so confused that the textbook authors
can ?prove? a basic point of far-reaching importance on one page and
flatly contradict this proof on the following page, without anyone
seeing that there is a conflict, is badly in need of an overhauling.

The information now available makes it quite clear that the electron is
not the permanent ?building block? type of entity that was envisioned in
1911, but an evanescent particle that can be created or destroyed with
relative ease. Recognition of this fact should carry with it the
realization that it is not only radioactivity that has ceased to be
evidence of the presence of electrons in matter; the appearance of
electrons in /any/ physical process can no longer be taken as an
indication that these electrons existed prior to the initiation of that
process. In fact, the weight of evidence is now strongly in favor of the
conclusion that in most cases they are created in the process, and that
where electrons do actually have a prior existence, they exist in, and
not as a part of, the atoms of matter.

This conclusion applies not only to electrons, but to electric charges
in general, irrespective of whether or not they can be definitely
identified with the presence or absence of electrons. A century ago it
was considered that the appearance of positively and negatively charged
ions when a material goes into solution constituted definite proof that
the charges also exist in the undissolved substance, and even today we
find the chemistry textbooks making such statements as this, ?We now
know that ionic compounds exist as ions even in the crystalline
state.?^28 <../cana/references.html#ref28> But again the advance of
knowledge has invalidated the prevailing conclusion. It has been found
that many substances which form ions in solution are definitely not of
the ?ionic? nature in the solid, and the same textbook from which the
foregoing statement was taken tells us a few pages later, ?If ions are
not present in an electrolyte before it is dissolved, they must be
formed from the molecules of the compound as it dissolves.?

This is precisely the same kind of a situation which we encountered in
connection with the question of the origin of the electrons which make
their appearance in radioactive disintegration. Many substances break up
into ions, at least partially, on going into solution, and if the
substance is of a type which, according to currently accepted theory,
/could/ be composed of ions in the solid state, the formation of ions in
solution is commonly interpreted as proof that the substance is thus
composed. But where there are reasons why the existence of ions in the
solid state is incompatible with present-day theory, exactly the same
evidence is taken to mean that the charges are created in the ionization
process. Here again, when we examine the situation carefully, it is
clear that the physical evidence does not distinguish between these
alternatives, but as long as it is necessary to assume that /some/ ions
are created in the process, it is obviously quite possible, and even
probable, that /all/ ions are thus created; that is, this is /the/ way
in which ions are formed. Thus the hypothesis that the ions exist in the
solid prior to solution is not only without the proof that is claimed;
it is not even the most probable of the readily available explanations
of the observed facts. The creation explanation has the distinct
advantage that it applies the same ionization mechanism to all
substances, whereas the alternative and generally accepted explanation
requires two different mechanisms.

Summarizing the foregoing, it is now apparent that electrons, and
electric charges in general, are easily created in physical processes of
various kinds, and hence the emission of electrons from matter during
such processes can no longer be considered as proof, or even as good
evidence, that the electrons, as such, existed in the matter before the
process took place.

*II*

At this juncture someone will probably point out that even though the
emission of electrons from matter can no longer be considered as /proof/
that the electron is a constituent of matter, the emission is still
/consistent/ with such a hypothesis, and definite proof from this source
is no longer necessary in view of the large amount of supporting
evidence now available elsewhere. The bald truth is that this other
evidence is chimerical; the whole history of the development of the
concept of the atomic electron is a story of piling one unsupported
assumption on top of another, and without the definite and positive
proof which the emission of electrons from matter was presumed to
furnish, the whole structure collapses. Bohr's original postulates, for
example, are simply ridiculous if he first has to /assume/ that the
electron is a constituent of matter, and then goes on to postulate
behavior characteristics for these hypothetical atomic constituents
totally unlike anything ever observed. If his action in abandoning the
solid ground of established physical facts and striking out on an
uncharted course of pure hypothesis can be justified at all, which is
questionable, it can only be justified on the ground that he thought
that definite and positive proof that the electron is a constituent of
matter already existed, and hence if the behavior of these atomic
electrons could not be explained in a normal manner, it was reasonable
to presume that they must follow some different laws.

As long as there is any question at all as to whether or not the
electron is actually a constituent of matter, the fact that the atomic
electron cannot be reconciled with known physical laws is a strong
argument against the existence of any such entity, not a justification
for formulating new physical laws. Had Bohr been in possession in 1913
of the experimental knowledge of the present day, including the now
well-established fact that electrons are transient entities that can be
readily produced or destroyed, it undoubtedly would have been obvious to
a scientist of his competence that the reason for his inability to fit
the atomic electron into the existing framework of physical laws was not
that this constituent of the atom is governed by a different set of
laws, but that no such atomic electron exists.

One of the characteristics of a sound physical theory is that it leads
in an easy and natural way ?with the appearance of a certain
inevitableness,? as Bridgman puts it, to explanations of physical
phenomena other than that for which it was originally developed.
Planck's original Quantum Theory, for example, was developed to explain
the behavior of radiation from an energy distribution standpoint, but
one of its first important consequences was a simple and logical
explanation of the photo-electric effect: a related but totally
different phenomenon. Similarly, we could expect that if the concept of
the electron as a constituent of matter were valid, we would find it
leading easily and naturally to solutions of other related problems. But
the whole history of this concept has been just the opposite. Nothing
has developed easily and naturally; every step that has been taken has
been forced and artificial, and each advance into new territory has been
made only by sacrificing some part of existing physical knowledge, so
far as its application to the atom is concerned.

As one observer expresses it, ?Bohr solved the problem of the stability
of a system of moving electric charges simply by postulating that the
cause of the instability... did not exist.?^29
<../cana/references.html#ref29> To the layman his might seem to involve
a rather drastic redefinition of the word ?solve,? but be that as it
may, the ensuing history of the Bohr atom and its lineal descendants is
one long series of problems for which there seems to be no solution
other than to postulate that they do not exist. The orbits which Bohr
postulated for the electrons could not be located specifically, hence it
was postulated that no definite orbits exist; the theoretical momentum
and position of an individual electron could not be reconciled, and a
?Principle of Uncertainty? was therefore formulated, asserting that the
electron could not have a definite momentum and a definite position at
the same time; even with the benefit of this extraordinary principle,
identification of positions was found to be impossible, so it was
postulated that the impossibility was inherent and that the best that
could be done was to calculate a probability that the electron might be
found at a certain location; some of the theoretical consequences were
inconsistent with the usual cause and effect relationships, and it was
therefore postulated that causal relations are not operative at the
subatomic level. Now in relatively recent years, the long list of
assumptions and postulates has been climaxed by the assumption,
sponsored by the Copenhagen school of theorists (who represent the
?official? viewpoint of present-day theoretical physics), and expressed
by Heisenberg in the previously quoted passage, that this atomic
electron does not even ?exist objectively.?

All of these ?solutions? of the problems that have been encountered in
the development of the concept of the electron as an atomic constituent
have, of course, modified the characteristics of the atomic electron
very drastically. As the nuclear atom was originally conceived, the
negatively-charged constituent was presumed to be the same electron that
is observed experimentally. This experimental electron is a definite and
well-defined thing, notwithstanding its impermanence. We can produce it
at will by specific processes. We can measure its mass, its charge, and
its velocity. We can control its movement and we have methods by which
we can record the path that it takes in response to these controls.
Indeed, we have such precise control over the electron movement that we
can utilize it as a powerful means of producing magnified images of
objects which are too small for optical magnification. In short, the
experimental electron is a well-behaved and perfectly normal physical
entity. But such an electron cannot even begin to meet the requirements
which have been established step by step for the atomic electron, as the
concept of this particle has been gradually modified to ?solve? one
problem after another. The atomic electron, as it is now portrayed, is
not a definite and tangible entity such as the experimental electron. It
does not conform to the usual physical laws in the manner of its
experimental counterpart, but has some unique and unprecedented behavior
characteristics of its own, including a strange and totally unexplained
ability to jump from one orbit to another (or to do something entirely
incomprehensible which has the same effect) with no apparent reason and,
so it seems, complete immunity from all physical limitations. We can
deal with it only on a statistical basis, and even then, as Herbert
Dingle points out, we can make our statistical methods for dealing with
such particles effective ?only by ascribing to the particles properties
not possessed by any imaginable objects at all.?^30
<../cana/references.html#ref30> Furthermore, as already mentioned, the
leading theorists of the present day tell us that the atomic electron
cannot be accommodated within the three-dimensional framework of
physical space; it must be regarded merely as a symbol rather than as an
objectively real particle.

In view of this fact that the atomic electron no longer has even a
remote resemblance to the experimental electron, it is manifestly absurd
to continue basing physical theory on the fiction that the two are
identical. The previous conclusion that there is no proof that the
electron is a constituent of the atom must therefore be extended to
assert specifically that the electron as known experimentally is
definitely /not/ a constituent of the atom. The hypothetical
negatively-charged atomic constituent currently sharing the name
?electron? with the experimental particle is something of a totally
different character, a purely theoretical creation, unrelated to
anything that has ever been observed and itself not capable of being
observed: an ?abstract thing, no longer intuitable in terms of the
familiar aspects of everyday experience,?^31
<../cana/references.html#ref31> as Margenau describes it.

*III*

It should be emphasized that the conclusion just stated-the conclusion
that the negatively charged constituent of the atom (if such a
constituent exists) is a purely hypothetical entity unrelated to the
experimental electron-is not something that has been developed in this
work, or that depends in any way on any of the arguments presented
herein. It is simply a necessary consequence of an obvious fact that
modern physicists have chosen to ignore: the fact that two physical
entities are not identical if they have little or no resemblance to each
other. If the theorists wish to contend that the hypothetical negative
constituents of the atom are identical with the experimentally observed
particles that we call electrons, then they must accept, with no more
than reasonable modifications justified by the environment, the
properties of the experimental electrons; if they find it necessary to
invest their hypothetical atomic constituents with a totally different
set of properties, then they cannot identify them with the experimental
electrons. Even the physicists, who in these days are permitted to ?get
away with murder,? as James R. Newman expresses it, must be required to
conform to some of the elementary rules of logic.

Long years of effort have convinced the theoretical physicists that the
first alternative, the construction of an atom in which the experimental
electron is the negatively charged constituent, is impossible. As
brought out earlier in this discussion, the concept of a nucleus
composed wholly or in part of a group of positively charged particles is
likewise untenable in the light of present-day knowledge. Assumption (2)
in the list previously given is therefore invalid; that is, if the atom
is constructed of ?parts,? these parts are not known subatomic
particles; they are purely hypothetical concepts of which no independent
experimental evidence exists. This is a difficult pill to swallow: a
conclusion that the scientific world will find very hard to accept, not
only because it invalidates many of the cherished ideas and concepts of
modern physical science, but also because it is in direct conflict with
the seemingly natural and logical inference which is immediately drawn
from the existence of radioactivity.

The original concept of the atom was that it is the indivisible ultimate
particle of matter; the word atom actually /means/ indivisible. But the
discovery of radioactivity showed that the atom is not indivisible, as
this is a process of disintegration, in which particles are ejected and
the original atom is transformed into one of a different kind. The
natural conclusion to be drawn from this new knowledge-the conclusion
that was drawn when the knowledge was new, and which is still one of the
principal supports for the present-day theory of the atom-is that the
atom is a complex structure composed of sub-atomic particles. The
validity of this conclusion in its general aspects will be discussed
later. For the moment we are dealing only with the question of the
nature of these particles.

Just as it is natural to conclude that the existence of radioactive
disintegration proves that the atom is composed of individual parts, so
it is natural to conclude that the particles ejected from the atom in
the process of disintegration are the parts of which the atom is
composed. In fact, this conclusion seems to be implicit in the first.
But this second of the natural and seemingly obvious conclusions turns
out to be entirely erroneous. Three types of particles emanate from the
disintegrating atom, and existing knowledge indicates that not one of
these three existed as such in the atom prior to the disintegration. The
alpha particles are positively charged helium atoms, and it was quickly
realized that they could not be primary atomic ?building blocks?;
present-day opinion, as previously noted, is that the beta particles,
which are electrons, are created in the disintegration process; and the
gamma particles (if we stretch the definition of ?particle? far enough
to include them) are photons, units of radiation, and have always been
considered to be products of the disintegration, not as pre-existing
entities.

This throws an entirely different light on the picture. If we were able
to show that the particles ejected by the atom were of such a character
that it could be logically concluded that they were the ?building
blocks? of which the atom is constructed, then we could take the stand
that radioactivity furnishes a satisfactory explanation of the general
nature of atomic structure. But the physicists cannot and do not contend
that this is true; when we boil their statements down to the essence, we
find that they are, in effect, advancing the curious contention that the
emission of certain particles from the atom during radioactive
disintegration is a proof that the atom is constructed of certain other
particles. This is a far cry from the conclusions which seemed so
natural and logical on first consideration of the phenomenon of
radioactivity. The physicists' present stand is neither natural nor
logical, and it destroys the whole force of the original argument. Not
only does it leave the question of the identity of the atomic
constituents entirely up in the air, but the fact that it has been
necessary to conclude that /all/ of the particles ejected by the
radioactive atom are created in the disintegration process also raises
some serious questions as to the validity of the basic assumption that
the atom is composed of ?parts.?

In any event it is now clear that the electron or any other particle
that is proposed as an atomic constituent will have to stand on its own
feet without any support from radioactivity. The conclusions of the
early 1900s to the contrary will simply have to be rewritten, in the
light of modern knowledge, no matter how reluctant the theorists are to
take this step. From the viewpoint which the advances in experimental
knowledge have given us, the textbook statement that ?the emission of
electrons by atoms is convincing evidence that electrons exist as such
inside atoms? must be rewritten to read that ?the creation of electrons
in physical processes such as radioactivity is convincing evidence that
electrons exist as such inside atoms,? which, of course, reduces it to
an absurdity. If the electron is to be advocated as an atomic
constituent, then some consistent picture of an atom constructed wholly
or in part of electrons will have to be devised and, as has been brought
out earlier in the discussion, it is now admitted that this cannot be
done if the atomic electron has the properties of the electron which is
observed experimentally. Hence we come back to the fact that if there is
a negatively charged constituent of the atom, it is not the
experimentally observed electron; it is a purely hypothetical particle
of a much different nature.

At this point, then, we can say that the nuclear atom, as currently
conceived, is impossible. It has been shown that the two items which are
relied upon to furnish proof of the validity of the basic assumptions on
which the nuclear theory rests not only do not supply any such proof,
when they are carefully analyzed, but actually furnish strong evidence
to the contrary. It has also been shown that without the pro(JNS1)of
which these two items, radioactivity and Rutherford's scattering
experiments, are supposed to furnish, the entire structure of the
nuclear theory collapses. Every one of the eight major assumptions of
this theory, as previously listed, topples in this general collapse,
except assumption (1), which we have not yet considered.

A most heretical conclusion? Perhaps so. But consider the following
statement by Erwin Schroedinger, one of the principal architects of
modern physical theory, who can hardly be classified as a scientific
heretic, and ask yourself whether he is not saying exactly the same
thing in more cautious words:

Once we have become aware of this state of affairs, the
epistemological question: ?Do the electrons really exist in these
orbits within the atom?? is to be answered with a decisive /No/,
unless we prefer to say that the putting of the question itself has
absolutely no meaning. Indeed there does not seem to be much sense
in inquiring about the real existence of something, if one is
convinced that the effect through which the thing would manifest
itself, in case it existed, is certainly /not/ observed. Despite the
/immeasurable/ progress which we owe to Bohr's theory, I consider it
very regrettable that the long and successful handling of its models
has blunted our theoretical delicacy of feeling with reference to
such questions. We must not hesitate to sharpen it again, lest we
may be in too great haste to content ourselves with the new theories
which are now supplanting Bohr's theory, and believe that we have
reached the goal which indeed is still far away.^32
<../cana/references.html#ref32>

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Previous D.B.Larson's book <../cana/cana02.htm>Index of D.B.Larson's
books <../cana/index.htm>Next D.B.Larson's book <../cana/cana04.htm>